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Until recently, U.S. corn exports 
destined for Canada faced a $1.65-
per-bushel tax. This tax, or import 
tariff, was Canada’s response to 
claims made by Canadian corn 
farmers that they are the victims of 
subsidized and dumped U.S. corn. 
The Canadian International Trade 
Tribunal just ruled against the im-
port tariff. 
The claim of injury to Cana-
dian corn producers was based on 
the notion that U.S. corn farmers 
consistently sell their corn for less 
than it costs to produce it. That 
is, cheap U.S. corn is “dumped” 
in Canada. It was further argued 
that the reason why corn farm-
ers can sell for such a low price 
and remain in business is that U.S. 
subsidies keep them afl oat. Im-
plicit in this argument is that if U.S. 
corn subsidies were eliminated, 
then U.S. corn production would 
decrease and the U.S. and Cana-
dian prices of corn would increase. 
This story is certainly consistent 
with many arguments made in the 
United States by supporters of U.S. 
farm programs. For example, Hem-
bree Brandon writes in the Delta 
Farm Press:
They [farm payments] really 
are a food subsidy assistance 
in disguise, and he [Ken Cook] 
and every person in this 
county (sic) who buys food 
and eats three squares a day 
are benefi ciaries of it—U.S. citi-
zens pay far less for food than 
anyone on the planet.  They are 
also a food security subsidy in 
disguise. God help the U.S. if it 
becomes as dependent on off-
shore food as it is offshore oil. 
(December 10, 2004)
Implicit in Mr. Brandon’s argu-
ment is that U.S. farm production 
would decline without U.S. farm 
payments, with resulting increases 
in commodity and food prices. 
The argument by Canada that 
their producers are harmed by low 
prices resulting from U.S. corn sub-
sidies is similar to Brazil’s argument 
made in their World Trade Organiza-
tion (WTO) dispute against the U.S. 
cotton program. Brazil successfully 
made the case that cotton payments 
increased U.S. production and low-
ered world prices to the detriment 
of Brazilian cotton producers. The 
WTO panel ruled that the United 
States needed to eliminate its export 
subsidy program, called Step 2, and 
it needed to eliminate programs that 
increase production and suppress 
world prices. 
What does all of this portend for 
U.S. corn farmers? If U.S. farm pro-
grams really are a “cheap food” policy 
in disguise, then Canadian corn farm-
ers would seem to have a valid argu-
ment that they have been harmed by 
U.S. subsidies. Is this argument valid? 
If so, then is the U.S. corn program as 
vulnerable to a negative WTO panel 
ruling as was cotton? 
Farm Programs and Cheap Food
U.S. farmers often justify farm 
program payments by linking the 
payments to the small share of U.S. 
disposable income that is spent on 
food. Those who make this linkage 
attribute high productivity and high 
production at the farm level to pro-
gram payments. The availability of 
less-expensive raw ingredients then 
decreases production costs of food 
processors and manufacturers, lead-
ing to lower food prices. If this story 
is true, then a removal of farm pro-
gram payments should lead to higher 
food prices. Logically, the largest 
increases should show up in food 
products in which currently subsi-
dized raw ingredients (corn, wheat, 
or soybeans) make up the largest 
share of total production costs.
A reasonable formula for approx-
imating how the price of a food item 
would change because of a change 
in the price of a raw ingredient is to 
multiply the percent change in the 
price of the raw ingredient by the 
share of the price of the food item 
that is represented by the cost of the 
raw ingredient. For example, corn 
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represents perhaps 38 percent of   
the cost of producing a market-ready 
hog. The cost of a market-ready hog 
represents 28 percent of the fi nal 
retail price of pork. This means that 
corn represents approximately 10.64 
percent of the retail price of pork. 
Suppose that the removal of 
farm programs caused the price of 
corn to increase by 5 percent. The 
price of pork would then increase 
by about 0.53 percent. That is, pork 
chops that cost $3.00 per pound 
with farm subsidies would increase 
in price by less than two cents per 
pound. If corn prices were to rise by 
10 percent with the removal of sub-
sidies, then pork chops would cost 
only three cents per pound more 
than they currently do. Because 
corn represents a smaller share 
of the fi nal value of beef and dairy 
products, retail prices for these 
products would go up by a smaller 
amount (in percentage terms) than 
the price of pork.
It is diffi cult to come up with 
examples in which subsidized U.S. 
commodities have a greater than 10 
percent share of fi nal retail value. 
And at this maximum share, it 
would take a doubling of commod-
ity prices to increase consumer 
prices by 10 percent. But no cred-
ible analyst has ever estimated 
that farm payments result in such 
a large supply expansion that their 
withdrawal would cause commodity 
prices to double. The idea that U.S. 
commodity policy is really a cheap 
food policy is a myth.
Supporters of farm programs 
who incorrectly justify them as pro-
viding cheap food to U.S. consumers 
should realize that they are pro-
viding ready ammunition to those 
countries who want to attack U.S. 
farm subsidies as being harmful to 
their domestic producers. After all, 
U.S. and world prices move togeth-
er because the commodities that 
receive U.S. subsidies are widely 
traded on international markets. If 
farm payments reduce U.S. prices, 
then they also reduce world prices, 
which means that farmers around 
the world are hurt by U.S. farm pay-
ments. Given the very large com-
modity price changes that would be 
required for a cheap food policy to 
be a reality, does use of this ratio-
nale for U.S. farm programs really 
serve U.S. producer interests?
A concrete example of how 
this type of argument can be used 
against U.S. producer interests is 
the compelling argument that Bra-
zil used in the cotton case that was 
obtained directly from supporters 
of the U.S. cotton program. In testi-
mony about the impacts of stricter 
payment limits, supporters of lax 
payment limits argued that strict-
er payment limits would cause a 
signifi cant decrease in U.S. cotton 
production. Put another way, cot-
ton payments cause cotton acreage 
to increase, which is exactly what 
Brazil was arguing.
Do U.S. Subsidies Decrease 
Commodity Prices?
Even if farm subsidies do not lead 
to cheap food, they can lead to 
cheap commodities, which poten-
tially makes U.S. farm programs 
vulnerable to further WTO panel 
judgments.
One of the key lessons of Eco-
nomics 101 is that it is a simple 
matter for government to get more 
of anything it wants: simply sub-
sidize its production. Although 
fi nal 2005 payments have not yet 
been determined, payments to 
U.S. corn producers are expected 
to average 26.7 percent of market 
revenue over the three crop years 
2003, 2004, and 2005. Total corn 
payments over these three years 
are expected to be $20.5 billion. 
Experts supporting Canada’s posi-
tion in the ongoing corn tariff case 
point to this 26.7 percent subsidy 
rate as prima facie evidence that 
U.S. corn payments increase pro-
duction, thereby lowering world 
corn prices. But, as is so often the 
case, reality is more complicated 
than a simple application of a les-
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son learned in an introductory eco-
nomics course.
The fi rst nuance is that 31 per-
cent of U.S. corn payments over this 
period (direct payments) are specifi -
cally designed not to infl uence U.S. 
corn plantings. These payments do 
not depend on prices, production lev-
els, acreage levels, or even whether 
farmers plant a crop. The one re-
striction is that farmers cannot plant 
fruits, tree nuts, or vegetables on land 
that qualifi es for these payments. 
This “fruit and vegetable exclusion” 
is relatively unimportant for corn, 
because the majority of corn land is 
best suited for feed grain production. 
If we remove direct payments from 
the calculations, then corn payments 
drop to 18.5 percent of market rev-
enue—still a large number.
The second nuance we need 
to account for is that 43 percent of 
the payments remaining after direct 
payments are removed are also de-
signed to have minimal infl uence on 
planting decisions. Farmers cannot 
change the size of countercyclical 
payments for corn by changing acre-
age or production levels, so these 
payments provide no direct incen-
tive to plant more corn when mar-
ket prices are expected to be low. 
However, countercyclical payments 
increase when market prices drop, 
so they do provide some price pro-
tection to farmers. Thus, although 
nobody knows for sure, most econo-
mists believe that these payments 
provide some incentive for farmers 
to plant corn. Analysts with the Food 
and Agricultural Policy Research 
Institute assume that $10.00 of ex-
pected countercyclical payments 
per acre provides the same produc-
tion incentive as $2.50 of expected 
market revenue. Accordingly, if we 
remove 75 percent of countercyclical 
payments, then corn payments drop 
to 11.7 percent of market revenue—
still a signifi cant number but fast 
becoming less signifi cant.
bumper crops are unexpected. Thus, 
the size of the payments that arrived 
was also unexpected. An additional 
surprise factor in 2005 was the large 
and negative impact of Hurricane Ka-
trina on local prices at harvest time. 
Most corn farmers took advantage 
of these low prices to lock in large 
windfall payments. Thus, we also need 
to reduce the 11.7 percent payment 
rate by the degree of “surprise” before 
we can conclude that U.S. commodity 
programs signifi cantly changed farm-
ers’ acreage decisions.
This discussion is not an attempt 
to minimize the impacts of U.S. farm 
subsidies on farmers’ acreage deci-
sions. Rather, it is meant to illustrate 
how complicated estimation of the 
impacts actually is. Farmers base 
their decisions about what and how 
much to plant on numerous factors, 
including rotation considerations, 
production costs, expected market 
prices, availability of crop insurance, 
and expected benefi ts from farm 
programs. The complicated nature 
of these decisions makes it quite 
diffi cult to determine if U.S. farm 
programs for crops other than cotton 
are vulnerable to a WTO case against 
them on the basis of price suppres-
sion. The role that these programs 
play in farmers’ planting decisions 
varies across crops, regions, and 
crop years. Simple “rules of thumb” 
that use total payment levels as a 
guide or the belief that the programs 
work as a cheap food policy are 
inadequate measures of the impacts 
of farm payments on U.S. supply and 
international commodity prices. ◆
Note of Disclosure: Professor Babcock 
was an expert witness testifying for a 
major Canadian corn importer in the 
inquiry by the Canadian International 
Trade Tribunal. In addition, he pro-
vided modeling assistance in 2003 to 
Professor Daniel Sumner, who was an 
expert witness for Brazil in the cotton 
case. 
Supporters of farm 
programs who 
incorrectly justify them 
as providing cheap 
food to U.S. consumers 
should realize that they 
are providing ready 
ammunition to those 
countries who want to 
attack U.S. farm 
subsidies as being 
harmful to their 
domestic producers.
There is near unanimity among 
economists that increases in ex-
pected marketing loan gains and 
loan defi ciency payments will 
increase planted acreage because 
they are paid on all current produc-
tion. However, it would be a mistake 
simply to conclude that farmers 
increased corn acreage from 2003 
to 2005 because farmers expected 
an 11.7 percent average boost in 
revenue from corn payments. We 
have to look at market conditions at 
the time that farmers decide what 
to plant to determine the infl uence 
of the programs.
As previously discussed in this 
publication, producers obtain the 
largest benefi t from the current set 
of farm programs in bumper-crop/
low-price years. We had back-to-back 
bumper crops in 2004 and 2005, with 
2004 being the largest increase over 
trend yields in history. By defi nition, 
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Agricultural Situation
Spotlight
Do Ethanol/Livestock Synergies Presage Increased 
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Increased ethanol production in Iowa and other Corn Belt states has led some to believe that the 
Midwest will no longer need to ex-
port any of its corn to other states or 
other countries. Farmer-advocates 
of more ethanol see such a future as 
making them free from reliance on 
unpredictable export markets, free 
from reliance on aging Mississippi 
River locks and dams, and free from 
worrying about the impacts of trade 
agreements and foreign competi-
tion. But such a future would not 
make the Corn Belt free of the need 
to export distillers grains, an ethanol 
by-product. 
Effi cient Use of By-products
A 50-million-gallon ethanol plant 
uses roughly 18.5 million bushels of 
corn. At the 2006 Iowa state-trend 
yield of 160 bushels per acre, this 
represents 116,000 acres of corn 
(80–90 percent of corn acreage in 
an average Iowa county). On a dry 
basis, 315 million pounds of distillers 
grains must be marketed.
The best use of this by-product 
is as feed for dairy and beef cattle. 
But Iowa has large numbers of hogs 
and poultry, not cattle. Without 
some resolution of this mismatch, 
most distillers grains from Iowa will 
continue to be dried and shipped to 
other states. 
Dairy cattle can be fed a diet 
with 20 percent of their dry mat-
ter intake in DDGS (distillers dried 
grains with solubles), which trans-
lates into 13 pounds of DDGS or ap-
proximately 40 pounds of wet distill-
ers grains per cow per day. Thus, an 
ethanol plant produces enough feed 
for roughly 60,000 dairy cattle. 
Iowa currently has only 190,000 
dairy cows in the state. Current Iowa 
production levels of 900 million gal-
lons of ethanol would require 1.08 
million dairy cows. This number of 
dairy cows would produce 15 per-
cent of total U.S. milk production, 
so this increase is not beyond the 
realm of possibility.
There are at least three syner-
gies that could occur from bringing 
dairy cattle (or beef cattle) into Iowa 
to consume the DDGS, as illustrated 
in Figure 1. The fi rst would occur if 
the dairy cattle were located close 
enough to the ethanol plants so that 
the distillers grains would not have 
to be dried. This would save the eth-
anol plant about $5 million in drying 
costs. The second synergy would 
be that 1.08 million dairy cattle 
generate vast amounts of valuable 
manure that can fertilizer crops 
and add to soil tilth. In most states 
where dairy cattle are located, the 
manure is a waste by-product rather 
than a valuable replacement for im-
ported fertilizer. The third possible 
synergy is if the dairy farmer and 
the ethanol plant worked together 
to capture the methane from the 
manure before it is applied to farm 
fi elds. Recent estimates of the Iowa 
Department of Natural Resources 
indicate that the manure from one 
dairy cow over one year can gener-
ate 3,170 kilowatt-hours of energy 
if the methane is captured from the 
manure. The manure from 60,000 
dairy cattle could produce enough 
methane to meet 25 percent of 
the natural gas requirements for a 
Figure 1. Possible synergies of ethanol and livestock co-production 
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50-million-gallon ethanol plant that 
does not have to dry the distillers 
grains. Capturing the methane from 
the manure would also help reduce 
odor problems for the dairy farm.
Will Iowa Encourage Growth 
of Livestock?
Whether Iowa embraces a future 
that includes a large increase in live-
stock depends on the strength of the 
fi nancial synergies just described 
as well as the political environment 
in the state. High energy prices 
increase the value of locating more 
cattle in Iowa. But the current politi-
cal environment works against more 
livestock. Many politicians and farm 
leaders must be asking themselves 
why they should lead the charge for 
more livestock when it is so much 
easier just to promote more ethanol 
production.
As shown in Figure 2, the top 
two uses for corn are domestic live-
stock feeds and exports. Ethanol has 
just passed the sum of all other uses, 
which includes seed, sweetener, 
and food. Given the planned expan-
sion of ethanol production, exports 
will soon drop to the number three 
position. At fi rst glance, this seems 
like a benefi cial move for U.S. corn 
producers. After all, corn that is 
used domestically saves on trans-
portation costs, boosts local basis, 
and creates domestic jobs. How-
ever, there are several reasons why 
ever-increasing reliance on ethanol 
markets may not be in the long-term 
best interest of Iowa’s corn farmers.  
One unforeseen impact of re-
placing exports with increased fuel 
use is that it will make the price of 
corn more sensitive to changes in 
quantity produced. Export demand 
is relatively price sensitive: a rela-
tively small drop in price can result 
in large changes in exports. Domes-
tic feed and fuel demand are price 
insensitive in that it takes a large 
drop in price to stimulate a signifi -
cant increase in demand. By making 
total corn demand less price sensi-
tive, the domestic price will drop 
by more in bumper crop years and 
will increase by more in short crop 
years. A future free of government 
subsidies would mean that corn 
farmers would have to rely on for-
ward contracting and the purchase 
of put options to protect themselves 
against downside price risk. Simi-
larly, livestock feeders and etha-
nol producers would have to use 
futures and call options to protect 
themselves against increased price 
volatility. 
A second impact of greater 
reliance on ethanol production is 
increased vulnerability to changes 
in technology or government policy. 
Currently, the low-cost feedstock 
for U.S. ethanol plants is corn. But 
the high price of oil combined with 
ethanol tax credits and the obvious 
widespread availability of cellulose 
has increased investment in technol-
ogies that could result in cellulose 
becoming the low-cost feedstock for 
ethanol. If this happens, the impacts 
on corn prices could be dramatic. 
Vulnerability also arises because 
ethanol profi tability largely depends 
on a combination of government 
tax credits and import tariffs. What 
would happen if in fi ve years the 
price of oil were to decline and, in 
a fi t of budget cutting responsibil-
ity, ethanol tax credits and ethanol 
import taxes were eliminated? After 
all, what is bestowed by government 
action can certainly be taken away.
Iowa is basking in the current 
economic benefi ts of the ethanol 
boom. But there are risks to corn 
farmers from ever-greater depen-
dence on ethanol as a determinant 
of the price of corn. Technology 
changes, as do governments. It may 
be wise in the long run to support 
the industry that will be with us 
when corn-based ethanol is replaced 
by the next great thing. After all, 
the growth in consumption of meat, 
eggs, and dairy products should 
continue to outpace growth in in-
come and population, unless human 
nature changes dramatically. ◆
Figure 2. Utilization of U.S. corn
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Figure 1. Ethanol production
Note: Ethanol represents only non-food ethanol, both fuel and non-fuel.
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515-294-6175
Increased interest in biofuels can be attributed to environmental, economic, and geo-political fac-
tors. Harmful emissions, high crude 
oil prices, and the growing dependen-
cy on foreign oil supplies all provide 
incentives for pursuing alternative 
fuel sources. However, the rising 
importance of ethanol can also be 
attributed to the desire by countries 
to develop new markets for agricul-
tural products. This push is currently 
policy driven, for example, in the 
United States through the U.S. energy 
bill. Even Brazil, an established pro-
ducer and consumer of ethanol, used 
mandates to encourage the use of 
ethanol when it launched its etha-
nol program, the National Alcohol 
Programme (PROALCOOL), in the 
mid-1970s. 
Ethanol can be produced from a 
variety of feedstocks, such as cereals, 
sugarcane, and cellulosic material. 
The value of feedstock is an important 
component in total production costs 
for ethanol. Ethanol in Brazil is pro-
duced from low-cost sugarcane and 
therefore can compete on a produc-
tion-cost basis with gasoline without 
any subsidies. However, in general, re-
newable fuels are still more expensive 
to produce than fossil-based fuels, 
and so both production and con-
sumption have been encouraged for 
the most part by government policy 
intervention through either mandates 
or market incentives. 
Many countries are taking an in-
creased interest in ethanol as an al-
ternative fuel, with the United States 
and Brazil currently leading the way. 
Ethanol production in both coun-
tries has been increasing rapidly in 
recent years, as seen in Figure 1.
Policy and Competitiveness of U.S. and Brazilian Ethanol
The U.S. Ethanol Market
The Energy Policy Act of 2005 man-
dates a minimum renewable fuels 
consumption of 4 billion gallons in 
2006, increasing to 7.5 billion gallons 
in 2012. The majority of the mandate 
most likely will be met by ethanol.
In 2005, U.S. ethanol produc-
tion capacity was 4.3 billion gallons 
from 95 ethanol refi neries. Capacity 
expansion totaled 0.2 billion gallons, 
while capacity under construction 
was 1.8 billion gallons. Ethanol pro-
duction consumed 1.6 billion bush-
els of corn (about 14 percent of U.S. 
corn production) in 2005; 2.6 billion 
bushels of corn are expected to be 
used by 2010 (about 22 percent of an 
11.9 billion bushel crop). Thus, etha-
nol production has already exceeded 
the 2006 target of the renewable fuel 
mandate. A federal tax credit of 51¢ 
per gallon on all ethanol, available to 
ethanol refi ners, has also contribut-
ed to increased ethanol production. 
Despite the rapid increase in produc-
tion, consumption of ethanol has 
been outpacing production for the 
past few years, which has led to in-
creased imports in the United States, 
as shown in Figure 2.
U.S. trade policy on ethanol 
includes an ad valorem tariff of 2.5 
percent as well as an import duty of 
54¢ per gallon. The tariff is meant 
to ensure that the benefi ts of the 
domestic U.S. ethanol tax credit do 
not accrue to foreign producers. 
The other important trade policy 
that affects ethanol is the Carib-
bean Basin Recovery Act (CBERA) 
that groups Central American 
countries with Caribbean countries. 
This Act created the current import 
rules for ethanol under the Carib-
bean Basin Initiative (CBI). 
Under this agreement, if ethanol 
is produced from at least 50 percent 
agricultural feedstock grown in a 
CBERA country, it is admitted free of 
duty. If the local feedstock content is 
lower, limitations apply on the quan-
tity of duty-free ethanol. The amount 
of ethanol that can be imported 
duty-free that is produced from 
non-CBERA agricultural feedstock is 
restricted to 60 million gallons or 7 
percent of the U.S. domestic ethanol 
market, whichever is greater. In this 
case, ethanol must be dehydrated 
in a CBI country. Dehydration plants 
are currently operating in Jamaica, 
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Figure 2. U.S. ethanol imports and exports
Table 1. U.S. Caribbean Basin tariff rate quota (million gallons)
2000 92.3 59.9  64.9 
2001 112.7 43.3  38.4 
2002 120.3 45.5  37.8 
2003 132.5 60.9  46.0 
2004 186.9 69.9  37.4 
2005 240.4 103.3  43.0
Year TRQ    Entered Fill rate (%)
Costa Rica, and El Salvador, where 
hydrous ethanol produced in other 
countries, historically Brazil or 
Europe, can be dehydrated. Table 1 
shows the tariff rate quotas (TRQs) 
and fi ll rates for ethanol imports 
from CBI countries. The TRQ for 
2006 is 268.1 million gallons.
The Brazilian Ethanol Market
Brazil is currently the world’s larg-
est producer of ethanol. The Brazil-
ian government provides support 
to ethanol production through both 
market regulation and tax incen-
tives. In terms of market regula-
tions, an offi cial blending ratio of 
anhydrous ethanol with gasoline of 
between 20 and 25 percent in trans-
port fuel is imposed. There are also 
credit provisions for ethanol stor-
age, in the form of a lower excise 
tax for ethanol than for gasoline 
and through the use of strategic re-
serves. Imports of ethanol to Brazil 
are subject to an ad valorem duty of 
20 percent. 
In 2005, production of sugar and 
ethanol in Brazil totaled 28.7 million 
metric tons and 4.8 billion gallons, re-
spectively, continuing a record trend 
for the past few years. The record 
production has resulted in sugar ex-
ports of 18.2 million metric tons and 
0.6 billion gallons of ethanol in 2005. 
In Brazil, a large number of plants 
are dual plants and can switch eas-
ily between the production of sugar 
and ethanol based on relative prices. 
Thus, sugar and ethanol prices tend 
to move closely together, whereas in 
the United States, movement in etha-
nol prices is affected primarily by 
gasoline and government regulations. 
In the past few years, relative prices 
of sugar and ethanol have favored 
more sugarcane diverted to ethanol 
production rather than to sugar. With 
the increased demand in ethanol 
both domestically and internation-
ally, the share of sugarcane used in 
ethanol production is expected to 
rise steadily. 
Increased demand for ethanol in 
Brazil has been driven by the popu-
larity of fl ex-fuel cars that can run 
on gasoline, ethanol, or a combina-
tion of the two. Ethanol and fl ex-fuel 
vehicles enjoy some tax incentives 
not offered to gasohol cars that run 
on blended gasoline. The sale of fl ex-
fuel cars has increased dramatically 
(by 585 percent in 2004) since their 
introduction in 2003. The share of 
fl ex-fuel cars reached 22 percent in 
2004, 40 percent in 2005, and is ex-
pected to rise to 60 percent in 2006. 
If both ethanol and sugar prices 
remain competitive in the near fu-
ture, Brazil is expected to continue 
to increase sugarcane production 
for both ethanol and sugar. The 
country has enough land to easily 
double sugarcane area harvested. 
Sugar production is expected to 
increase by 21.5 percent between 
2005/06 and 2015/16 while exports 
are projected to increase 22 percent 
during the same period. In terms of 
ethanol, production is expected to 
increase by 37.5 percent while etha-
nol exports are expected to nearly 
double by 2015/16.
Competitiveness of the 
United States versus Brazil
The cost of ethanol per gallon of fuel 
from sugarcane in Brazil, at $0.83 
per gallon of fuel, is lower than the 
cost from corn in the United States, 
at $1.09 per gallon (see the OECD 
report “Agricultural Market Impacts 
of Future Growth in Production of 
Biofuels,” available at http://www.
oecd.org/dataoecd/58/62/36074135.
pdf). In addition to higher costs of 
production, there are high costs in 
Continued on page 11
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The Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) is a vol-untary environmental program for agricultural producers aimed at protecting environmentally 
sensitive land, improving water quality, limiting soil 
erosion, and promoting wildlife habitat. The CRP has 
existed since 1985 and has protected at least 30 million 
acres nationwide each year since 1990, pulling some 
acreage out of crop production. Currently, roughly 35.9 
million acres are enrolled in the CRP. Producers bid to 
participate in the CRP and bids are evaluated based on 
the environmental benefi ts and fi nancial costs of the 
CRP contracts. Acreage bid into the CRP program is un-
der contract for a set number of years and is planted to 
“resource-conserving vegetative covers,” such as native 
grasses and trees. 
Figure 1 shows when current CRP acres were last 
enrolled. The largest enrollment year for these CRP 
acres occurred in 1998, when nearly 18.5 million acres 
entered or re-entered the program. Many of these acres 
could possibly come back into crop production in the 
next few years. In 2006, less than 2 percent of all CRP 
acreage could come out of the program. But as Figure 
2 shows, a majority of CRP acres enrolled in 1998, 16 
million, could come out of the program in 2007. In Iowa, 
over 25 percent of all CRP land could be put into pro-
duction. That amounts to over 500,000 acres. 
The release of these acres from the CRP could 
have a tremendous impact on crop production and 
profi tability. Figures 3 and 4 show where current CRP 
acreage and where the acreage eligible to leave CRP 
in 2007 are located throughout the country. While the 
Great Plains has most of the CRP land, areas in the 
major producing regions of corn, soybeans, and cotton 
have also participated in the program. The acreage 
that could be released in 2007 is throughout the major 
wheat-producing regions, the western and southern 
Corn Belt, the Texas panhandle, Alabama, and Missis-
sippi. Strong crop prices, especially for wheat, cotton, 
corn, and/or soybeans, could pull acreage out of the 
CRP and into production. Table 1 shows a breakdown 
of the U.S. acreage eligible to exit CRP in 2007 by the 
major crop produced in each county. Wheat is the 
Figure 1. CRP acreage percentage enrollment by year
Figure 2. Timing of expiration of CRP contracts
Table 1. 2007 expiring CRP acreage by major crop
Crop Acreage
Barley 289,189
Corn 1,934,847
Cotton 1,457,010
Oats 27,493
Rice 3,797
Sorghum 70,780
Soybeans 2,597,217
Wheat 9,301,772
SPRING 2006            CENTER FOR AGRICULTURAL AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT      9 
Iowa Ag Review
major crop alternative for over half of the acreage, 9.3 
million acres. If wheat prices are strong going into the 
fall of 2007, it is conceivable that many of the 9.3 million 
acres could come back into wheat production. Soybeans, 
corn, and cotton also have over 1 million acres currently 
in CRP that could emerge by the 2008 crop year.
Realizing this, USDA has begun notifying partici-
pating producers about their eligibility to extend their 
Figure 3. Current CRP acres
Figure 4. Acres with expiring CRP contracts in 2007
current CRP contracts for 2 or 5 years or to re-
enroll in the CRP under a 10- to 15-year contract. 
Also, USDA has opened a general CRP sign-up 
this spring to maintain acreage in the program. 
So while USDA is working on maintaining acreage 
in the CRP, it remains to be seen how successful 
this initiative will be and how much acreage will 
return to crop production. ◆
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Personal income growth and increased urbanization have Mexican consumers putting 
more pork into their shopping bas-
kets. In response to this strong de-
mand, the Mexican hog industry has 
consolidated into larger and more 
effi cient operations and adopted 
improved genetics and management 
practices. Pork production in Mexico 
has increased by 23 percent be-
tween 1995 and 2005. However, this 
increased production has not kept 
pace with demand, so imports have 
surged to supply the shortfall. In 
2005, Mexico imported 201,795 met-
ric tons of U.S. pork, 118,140 metric 
tons of U.S. pork variety meats, and 
more than 122,000 live U.S. slaughter 
hogs. 
The changes in domestic pro-
duction and imports have accompa-
nied important structural changes 
in the Mexican pork industry that 
include disease prevention and 
eradication, improvements in 
slaughter and processing plants, 
and consumer education. Some of 
these changes have been driven by 
Mexico’s strong desire to export 
pork to the United States, Japan, 
and other countries; others result 
from efforts to improve the quality 
and safety of the pork supply.
On the export side, classical 
swine fever (CSF) has been a major 
factor in preventing Mexico from 
shipping pork to other countries. 
However, through eradication, 
prevention, and control programs, 
Mexico has regionalized several CSF-
Mexico’s Improving Pork Sector Creates Positives for Imports
free states that are recognized by 
importing countries, including Japan 
and the United States. Japan is cur-
rently Mexico’s largest export market 
for pork. Mexico has exported a 
growing volume of pork to Japan for 
several years, but exports under a 
bilateral free trade agreement began 
in April 2005 with a low-tariff quota 
of 38,000 metric tons in JFY 2005 that 
will increase to 80,000 metric tons by 
JFY 2009. And, given that Mexico is 
pork-defi cit, any exports will create 
demand for additional imports from 
the United States and Canada.
More Federally Inspected Plants
These exports would not be pos-
sible without slaughter and process-
ing facilities that meet international 
standards, and the Mexican govern-
ment has committed resources to 
improving the availability and quality 
of federally inspected (Tipo Inspec-
ción Federal, or TIF) facilities and 
encouraging producers to use these 
facilities rather than using munici-
pal plants or traditional slaughter 
methods. In 1999, Mexico had 33 TIF 
slaughter plants; by 2005, the num-
ber had grown to 160. The number of 
TIF plants that process pork is also 
increasing rapidly, especially in large 
metropolitan areas. In addition to the 
construction of new plants, many ex-
isting plants are undergoing extensive 
remodeling to meet sanitation, space, 
and temperature requirements. 
Because slaughter and fabrication 
in TIF plants are more expensive than 
in non-TIF plants, the Mexican govern-
ment has used economic incentives to 
encourage construction, remodeling, 
and use of these plants. In 2003, for 
example, domestic producers received 
$7 per head, on average, in govern-
ment payments for hogs slaughtered 
in TIF plants. This assistance covered 
the higher costs associated with meet-
ing higher quality standards required 
by TIF plants compared to non-TIF 
plants. In 2004, the Mexican govern-
ment provided a cost differential of 
about $4.63 per animal for TIF slaugh-
ter of domestic hogs. Implemented 
on a regular basis, programs like this 
would likely have a signifi cant effect 
on promoting the use of TIF plants, 
which would improve the overall safe-
ty and quality of pork in Mexico. 
The Mexican government’s em-
phasis on developing TIF plants may 
have indirect benefi ts to the U.S. pork 
industry because a large percentage of 
TIF plant capacity in Mexico is underuti-
lized. A recent study estimated that, on 
a country-wide basis, between 40 per-
cent and 45 percent of TIF slaughter ca-
pacity is not used (this includes slaugh-
ter capacity for pork and other species). 
Given that all imported slaughter hogs 
must be processed in TIF plants, the in-
crease in the number of TIF plants and 
the high level of unused capacity would 
be expected to encourage larger im-
ports of live U.S. hogs so long as prices 
are favorable to imports.
Retail Sales Shifting Toward 
Supermarkets
Changes at the retail level may also 
benefi t the pork industries in both the 
United States and Mexico. Although 
traditional markets continue to hold 
the largest market share for meat sales 
in Mexico, large supermarkets and su-
perstores have increased their share 
of food sales as rising incomes and 
The Mexican government’s 
emphasis on developing 
TIF plants may have
indirect benefi ts to the U.S. 
pork industry because a 
large percentage of TIF 
plant capacity in Mexico 
is underutilized. 
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the United States of transporting 
supply from the Midwest to major 
population areas. This has led to 
an increase in competitiveness of 
Brazilian ethanol imports despite the 
steep tariffs. Furthermore, volatility 
in U.S. ethanol prices, which some-
times leads to spikes, provides Brazil 
the opportunity to export ethanol 
to the United States. For example, in 
October 2005, the Brazilian ethanol 
price was $1.38 per gallon. Adding 
freight and the import tariff, the price 
for ethanol would be about $2.12 per 
gallon (including the 16¢-per-gallon 
transportation cost), which is below 
the $2.47 per gallon U.S. price for the 
same month. Consequently, Brazil 
was able to export 5.2 million gallons 
to the United States, up from zero 
exports in August and 2.7 million 
gallons in September 2005. In total, 
Brazil exported 86.5 million gallons 
of ethanol in 2004 and 65.9 million 
gallons in 2005, becoming the ma-
jor source of U.S. ethanol imports. 
These imports may increase in the 
future, because of the projected ex-
panding demand for ethanol in the 
United States. ◆ 
Simla Tokgoz and Amani Elobeid 
are international commodity ana-
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with the Food and Agricultural Policy 
Research Institute at CARD. 
U.S. and Brazilian Ethanol
Continued from page 7
urban location allow more consum-
ers to shop in these stores. In 2005, 
an estimated 40 percent of all food 
sold in Mexico was sold in super-
markets and 60 percent was sold in 
traditional markets. Within fi ve years, 
these percentages are expected to 
be reversed, with supermarkets ac-
counting for 60 percent of total food 
sales and 40 percent being sold in 
traditional markets.
Increased supermarket sales 
will guide future changes in the 
Mexican industry. For example, to 
help pull TIF-processed meat into 
supermarkets, the Mexican govern-
ment introduced a program that 
rewarded processors and retailers 
for promoting federally inspected 
meat and educating consumers 
about its benefi ts in terms of quality 
and safety. Under this promotional 
program, the government provided 
a one-to-one match for money spent 
promoting meat slaughtered and 
processed in TIF plants. This match 
was available to anyone in the pork 
supply chain, and the promotions 
targeted consumers through highly 
visible marketing materials at meat 
counters and displays in supermar-
ket meat cases. 
Overall Demand Benefi ts 
U.S. Exports
As with the movement toward TIF 
processing and slaughter, this type 
of program has potential benefi ts for 
imported product. Because U.S. live 
hogs must be slaughtered in TIF 
plants, the pork from these animals 
enters the Mexican retail and manu-
facturing sector as TIF-certifi ed. In 
addition, imported U.S. pork that 
is cut, further processed, or fabri-
cated at a TIF plant receives the TIF 
certifi cation seal and is not differ-
entiated from domestic product. 
To the extent that such promotions 
increase overall demand for pork in 
supermarkets, they benefi t imports 
of U.S. live hogs and pork through 
overall increased sales and by edu-
cating consumers about the safety 
and quality associated with pork 
processed in federally inspected 
facilities and sold in modern retail 
outlets. This type of program also 
complements programs by the U.S. 
Meat Export Federation to educate 
Mexican consumers about the de-
sirability and value of these same 
attributes in imported U.S. pork.
One result of the TIF promo-
tional program has been that many 
retail outlets and TIF processing 
facilities now purchase meat only 
from TIF facilities. The resulting in-
crease in demand for meat from TIF 
plants has encouraged managers 
of non-TIF plants to upgrade their 
facilities and apply for TIF certifi -
cation in order to retain access to 
the important retail and process-
ing sectors in metropolitan areas of 
Mexico. In addition, some import-
ers who previously had not done 
further processing are upgrading 
their facilities and applying for TIF 
certifi cation so they can add value 
to imported pork by cutting, pack-
aging, and other processing before 
selling it to processors or end users.
Industry sources have indicated 
that the higher cost of TIF-processed 
pork relative to pork from non-TIF 
sources and to substitutable prod-
uct (poultry meat for example) con-
tinues to limit retail sales and the 
use of TIF-certifi ed pork in manufac-
tured products. With an estimated 
40 percent of the population living 
below the poverty level in Mexico, 
the demand for very inexpensive 
sources of protein throughout the 
country remains strong. However, 
the Mexican government’s support 
of programs to improve supply and 
demand of pork processed at TIF 
plants has encouraged the domes-
tic industry to improve product 
safety and quality. Mexican consum-
ers and the Mexican pork industry 
are the major benefi ciaries of these 
programs, but U.S. pork should see 
some long-term benefi ts from overall 
improvements in Mexico’s pork pro-
cessing and retail sectors. ◆
Roxanne Clemens is managing direc-
tor of the Midwest Agribusiness Trade 
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